Merk
Commentary: Merk sells Euro to buy Australian
Dollar
Axel
Merk, Portfolio Manager, Merk
Funds September
9, 2011
www.merkfunds.com/merk-perspective/insights/2011-09-09-merk-sells-euro.html?type=mi Given that many know Merk
Investments as "euro bulls", arguing that the euro can thrive
despite all the turmoil in the Eurozone, we wanted
to share with our investors and the public that in our hard currency
strategy, with over $700 million in assets, we sold over U.S. $90 million
worth of euros late Thursday to re-allocate to the
Australian dollar; this re-allocation was an acceleration of a recent trend
to deploy euro holdings elsewhere. The strategy is now underweight in euros. Our move was motivated by recent European Central
Bank (ECB) and U.S. Federal Reserve communication:
While we are underweight the euro in the
short-term, we remain long-term positive, as we believe the concerns
surrounding the crisis in the Eurozone should
primarily be played out in the pricing of the bond market: in our assessment,
it is appropriate to have the bonds of Eurozone
countries trade akin to municipal bonds, as they cannot print their own
money. As such, the bond market has been providing “encouragement” for
reform. The process, granted an ugly one, is imposing structural reform; as
countries drag their feet implementing reforms, the bond market will continue
to keep policy makers’ feet to the fire. The same can be said of banks:
courtesy of recent stress tests, the market can now target weak banks, “encouraging”
them to raise more capital. Also note that while a centralized European
fiscal authority would be helpful, we already have a mechanism in place in
which a country that wants to tap into cheaper funding has to give up
sovereign control over its budgeting. The difference is that a streamlined
process under which a country could tap into Eurobonds would be less
stressful than the drama playing out whenever someone needs to access
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and European support resources. Germany is
right in resisting a rush to introduce Eurobonds, so that processes are put
in place that don’t lead to excessive money
squandering. Overall, we believe it is far more difficult in the Eurozone to spend and print money than in the U.S. As such, we are fighting the myth that economic
growth is necessary to have a strong currency. We believe that this
relationship is true in countries with a current account deficit, notably the
U.S.; but at the other end of the spectrum, Japan, we have seen decades of lackluster
growth, yet a strong currency. Indeed, a government incapable of introducing
spending programs allows market forces to play out, leading consumers to
spend less and save more: given that Japan historically finances its deficits
domestically, a slowing economy may be a positive for the yen. The Eurozone, with a current account roughly in balance, may
experience a strong euro even with the turmoil going on. Think of it this
way: in the U.S., Fed Chairman Bernanke has testified that going off the gold
standard during the Great Depression may have helped the U.S. recover faster
than those that held on to the gold standard. What many don’t fully
appreciate is that someone is on the other side of the trade. In today’s
world, we believe the euro is on the other side of Bernanke’s trade: as the
ECB has only printed a fraction of the money the Fed has printed, the Eurozone economy may exhibit lackluster growth, but the
currency may ultimately be much stronger. Having said that, we must not ignore other factors
in this analysis, such as the more dovish view of the ECB in the short-term.
Long-term, we would like to point out that commodity prices may remain
elevated for a long time as a result of continued easy central bank money;
the Fed historically considers high commodity prices transitory, whereas
central banks in the rest of the world typically tighten monetary policy in
an effort to minimize what is referred to as “second round effects”, i.e. the
creeping of inflationary pressures through the value chain. For this reason
alone, diverging monetary policies may be evident for a considerable period;
Fed policy may stay on the side of easing, whereas ECB policy may have a
tightening bias. Axel Merk |
